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S

ince the late 1980s, and especially since the tragic events of 11 September
2001, two phenomena, both known for their pragmatic and controversial
nature, have come together to pose challenges for US policymakers. The first
phenomenon is the rise in importance of special operations forces (SOF). This
is evident in the 1987 creation of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) later followed by the Bush Administration’s 2004 decision, through the Unified Command Plan, to assign USSOCOM the primary
responsibility for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. In light of the need
for anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency expertise and the asymmetric nature
of many current threats, SOF have been described as a “logical military response,” one that, for General Peter Schoomaker, provides “an array of expanded options, strategic economy of force, [and] ‘tailor to task’capabilities.”1
Despite the logicality, however, such an approach threatens to exacerbate divides, real and perceived, between the conventional and unconventional
military communities. In addition to aggravating concerns related to shares of
limited resources, the skimming of individuals with high leadership potential,
and differing opinions regarding how military organizations should look and
act, there is the possibility of antagonism as SOF are often presented as a panacea or a “silver bullet.”2 In the United States and other Western countries, these
concerns regarding the utility and implications of SOF vis-à-vis their conventional brethren have existed since the creation of special units in World War II;
it is not surprising that they continue today.
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The second, and perhaps more surprising, phenomenon is the reshaping of the assumed state monopoly over the management and ownership of the
means of violence. Several studies have examined the supply, demand, and
ideational reasons, many linked to the end of the Cold War, which created the
marketplace for the modern-day international private security company (PSC).3
From one standpoint, PSCs represent an economic response in a globalized marketplace at a time when states may not be able or willing to respond promptly to
crises due to political or organizational restraints. PSCs can provide, as force
multipliers, support to state militaries committed to particular operations. From
another standpoint, however, the rise of PSCs is highly controversial because of
potential negative implications related to political authority, military command
and control, and maintenance of the military ethos. Moreover, many PSC employees were previously members of state security sectors, thus revealing the
movement of uniformed personnel to the private sector.
This article draws attention to the fact that as SOF in the United States
and elsewhere strain to meet the expanding operational tempo and as the PSC
presence increases internationally, the “fortunes” of both state militaries and
PSCs are linked to what is becoming a zero-sum game for SOF’s expertise. The
article argues that to delink public and private actors from this game the US, as
the main consumer of PSC services, must treat SOF expertise, whether in public or private hands, as a strategic resource. This is appropriate in order to
lessen PSC’s focus on SOF personnel and to not aggravate relations between
the conventional and unconventional US military communities. To make this
argument, the article first describes the decline in SOF personnel and the related proclivity of many PSCs to rely on former SOF operators. It then suggests
the rationale for US activism on the basis of increasing SOF demands, the nature of current SOF retention efforts, and consideration of how former SOF
personnel are employed in the private sector.

Implications of the Decline in SOF Personnel
Because exit surveys for departing SOF personnel do not determine
conclusively the nature of post-military employment, there are no exact statistics
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as to the rate and number of SOF personnel transfers from the US military to PSC
employment. Nevertheless, it is clear that two main variables encourage this
transfer—remuneration and operational tempo. With respect to remuneration,
the Government Accountability Office reported in July 2005 that monthly salaries ranged between $12,000 and $13,000 were likely for former SOF personnel
in Iraq; some PSC employees were paid as much as $33,000 per month.4 Though
such amounts are well above that normally paid to those in uniform, Rebecca
Ulam Weiner contends this higher private sector remuneration should not come
as a surprise because “the true value of labor . . . has been artificially under compensated due to the nation’s monopoly on military service.”5 Normatively, one
can argue that such high payments are appealing to and accepted by former SOF
personnel because charges of mercenarism in the most pejorative sense have not
been forthcoming. Whereas such private activities were once taboo due to the
rise of the citizen-army in the nineteenth century, the private presence is now increasingly welcomed and valued. For instance, the deaths of four Blackwater
USA employees in Fallujah on 31 March 2004 served as one of the catalysts for
large-scale US military operations against insurgents in the city the following
month. Similarly, US government officials have publicly recognized the contributions and mourned the deaths of private sector personnel. As a result, official
sanction, rather than abhorrence, of PSC activities implicitly underscores the apparent acceptability of the high salaries.
As for operational tempo, private employment offers some relief to
SOF personnel. Over the course of the 1990s, the activities of US special operations forces gradually increased so that by 1997, approximately 4,760 personnel were deployed abroad every week, a threefold increase from 1991. With the
advent of the Global War on Terrorism, USSOCOM personnel have become
stretched even further. As an example, a US Navy sea-air-land team (SEAL)
member currently spends six months abroad during an 18-month period rather
than the previous standard of six out of every 24 months. In recent years, 100
percent of the US Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment and 90 percent
of the Air Force Special Tactics Squadrons have been deployed to either Afghanistan or Iraq. In the Iraq case, some 9,000 to 10,000 US special operations
forces personnel (including operators, administrators, and support staff) are
deployed from a total contingent that is only 49,000 strong. In the face of this
demand, one that obviously causes physical and mental strain and is disruptive
to family life, PSC employment offers greater choice in assignments, a more
flexible work schedule, and ample leave time.
Another complicating variable is that the maintenance of high standards for special operations forces personnel sometimes means that organizations are understaffed to avoid the dilution of expertise, a factor further
exacerbated by the private manpower drain. Depending on the SOF tier under
60
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“The challenge, however, is that more senior
SOF personnel, those frequently tasked as
trainers and mentors, are the individuals
seeking earlier than expected
release from service.”

consideration, only 10 to 30 percent of recruits are successful in their attempts
to join. As such, in 2001, US Army Special Forces were at 94 percent. Similarly, US Navy SEALS remained at 89 percent of required enlisted strength in
2005. In many cases, the positions left unfilled are those of operators with critical combat skills.6 Likewise, quickly filling these billets with experienced personnel is not an option given estimates that it takes five to six years to train and
educate a fully qualified SOF soldier.7 To not respect the necessary growth
time would undermine USSOCOM’s enduring truths: “Humans are more important than hardware. Quality is better than quantity. Special Operations
Forces cannot be mass-produced. Competent special operations forces cannot
be created after emergencies occur.”8
In order to handle increasing responsibilities, the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review calls for a gradual expansion of SOF by 15 percent in FY2007.
This expansion places particular emphasis on US Army Special Forces, US
Navy SEALS, and personnel trained in civil affairs duties and psychological
warfare. The challenge, however, is that more senior SOF personnel, those frequently tasked as trainers and mentors, are the individuals seeking earlier than
expected release from service. While departure of individuals with only 20
years of service declined during 2002 and 2003, when stop loss policies were in
place, the Government Accountability Office reported in 2005 that attrition returned to approximately 2001-levels upon relaxation of these policies. Given
that markets for PSC services increased in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere during the stop loss years, and pressures on SOF personnel continue
to mount, if not heightened, movement from government to the private sphere
can be expected. Already, USSOCOM reports a possible undermining of its enduring truths: “[B]ecause the command is losing some of its most experienced
personnel, younger less experienced servicemembers [sic] are being promoted
to leadership positions more quickly than in the past.”9 The longer this drain
continues the more difficult it becomes to manage and prevents USSOCOM
from ensuring that the requisite quantity of skilled personnel are available for
its increasing workload.
Winter 2006-07
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SOF and Private Actors
Special operations forces personnel have long been linked to private
security companies, in some cases even before the end of the Cold War. For
example, Sir David Stirling, one of the World War II founders of the British
Special Air Service (SAS), formed Watchguard International in 1967, a private security company that Kevin O’Brien labels as “the model for all future”
firms.10 Watchguard International offered security analyses, military training, and personal protection services to government clients, mostly in former
British colonies in the Middle East and Africa. In the 1980s, another former
SAS member, David Walker, operated the PSCs Saladin Securities Limited
and Keeny Meeny Services. The name Keeny Meeny came from the Swahili
phrase keeni meeni, meaning deadly snake in long grass, and is regularly used
by the SAS to describe covert, stealthy, and dangerous operations. Perhaps
even more direct in its SOF linkages was Special Advisory Services, a British
PSC that functioned in the 1970s under the “SAS” acronym.
Arguably the best-known PSC from the 1990s, Executive Outcomes (EO) based in South Africa, was comprised mainly of SOF personnel
(EO closed in 1999). Though many different nationalities rounded out EO’s
ranks, the bulk of its expertise was South African. With few exceptions,
EO’s South African personnel came from Apartheid-era counterinsurgency
special operations forces, many having extensive operational experience in
Southern Africa. A number of these units had been disbanded by 1994: the
1-5 Reconnaissance Commandos (Reccies), the 44th Parachute Brigade
(Parabats), the paramilitary unit Koevoet (Crowbar), and the 32d Buffalo
Battalion, the most decorated South African combat unit since the end of the
Second World War. Of the pool of 2,000 personnel EO claimed it could draw
upon for its operations, 70 to 75 percent were from the Buffalo Battalion.
The PSC’s founder and chief executive officer until July 1997, Eeban
Barlow, was the second-in-command of the Buffalo Battalion in the mid1980s. Other members of EO’s hierarchy, Lafras Luitingh and Nic Van den
Bergh, had links to the Reccies and Parabats respectively.11
In more recent times, contemporary PSCs have advertised their capabilities by highlighting SOF expertise. A partial list of these PSCs includes the
following firms, mostly based in the United States and United Kingdom: Aegis
Specialist Risk Management, AKE Group, ArmorGroup, Blackwater USA,
Britam Defence, Custer Battles, DME Risk Management, Erinys, Hart Security,
ICP Group Limited, ISI Group, Meyer & Associates, Mi2International, Olive
Group, Pilgrim Elite, Phoenix CP, RamOPS Risk Management Group, SOCSMG, Triple Canopy, TOR International, Trojan Securities International, and
Unity Resources Group LLC. The managers and employees of the US firms
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boast expertise garnered from all three tiers of special operations forces, including the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta), Navy SEALS, Army
Special Forces, and Army Rangers. Along these lines, Triple Canopy, one of the
better known companies, suggests it has “more former Tier One special operations professionals than any organization other than the US military.”12 Similarly, PSCs also garner management and manpower from the SAS, the British
Special Boat Service, and special operations forces from countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Overall, the PSC industry possesses a wealth
of experience pertaining to counterterrorism, combat operations, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and military training.
One can readily identify three specific reasons for the correlation between SOF and PSCs. The first relates to recruitment and reflects an observation made by James Wood, a former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for African Affairs, that PSCs manage by Rolodex.13 Because the
permanent staffs of many PSCs are quite small, they rely heavily on manpower databases consisting primarily of former military personnel from
which they can draw manpower to fulfill contractual obligations. While there
are a number of ways in which these databases are compiled, such as job fairs
and advertising through the internet and print media, informal links and networks often suffice. These informal methods permeate the SOF community
and are directly related to the SOF roots of many PSC founders and managers.
The tight links that exist amongst SOF operators because of their common experience and training provides additional incentive for joining PSCs.
Second, while some countries, the United States included, have implemented general regulatory policies regarding licensing and contract approval for PSCs, regulation is currently lacking regarding the qualitative
standards of PSC personnel. As a result, PSC reliance on SOF-expertise
serves as a regulatory surrogate due to the rigorous training and assessment
required of uniformed SOF. Indeed, the high recruitment standards for special operations forces are well known throughout the military and recruits
that are successful receive additional training to enhance their language
skills, cultural understandings, adaptability, and martial capabilities. Additionally, SOF possess great leadership abilities, a point long recognized by
conventional forces. For instance, Field Marshal Viscount Slim accused SOF
of “skimming the cream” from conventional forces; military historian Philip
Warner contends that SOF volunteers “are the most enterprising, energetic,
and least dispensable.”14 The issue of dispensability now confronts SOF as
one US military official asks rhetorically: “We have always had very capable,
experienced, well-trained soldiers. . . . Guess what industry likes?”15
The third reason, also linked to qualitative factors, is the intangible
benefits that PSCs seemingly accrue through reliance upon an “elite.” The seWinter 2006-07
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“While perhaps a helpful incentive for many
SOF operators, the particular emphasis on
increased remuneration for continued
service cannot halt the transition
of SOF personnel to PSCs . . .”

curity marketplace, like any other, is a social construction in which participants
place value on certain phenomena for both pragmatic and emotive reasons. In
this regard, Eliot Cohen identifies the characteristics leading to elite status:
“First, a unit becomes elite when it is perpetually assigned special or unusual
missions. . . . Secondly, elite units conduct missions which require only a few
men who must meet high standards of training and physical toughness. . . .
Thirdly, an elite unit becomes elite only when it achieves a reputation—
justified or not—for bravura and success.”16 At present, SOF have obtained this
elite status given USSOCOM’s aforementioned rise in prominence, a prominence reinforced by the praise from public officials and the generally positive
portrayal of SOF personnel in the popular news and entertainment media. For
instance, Senator John Kerry, while campaigning in 2004 as the Democratic
Party’s presidential candidate, called for a doubling of US Army Special
Forces. The marketability of elite status that results from such acts is an important factor that PSCs rely on for promotional purposes.

Measures Taken
To maintain the strength of its SOF operators, USSOCOM launched a
study in December 2003 to determine how to lessen the loss of such highly
skilled personnel. Key issues included educational incentives, bonuses, retirement benefits, and salaries. This process culminated in December 2004 with
USSOCOM’s announcement of a $168 million remuneration plan. For approximately 7,000 operators of mid-level rank or higher, the plan increased monthly
pay by $375 and for senior-level grades the monthly increase was $750. A select
number of senior operators—1,500 individuals mostly at the rank of sergeant,
petty officer, and warrant officer with a minimum 19 years of service—were entitled to sliding scale bonuses. These ranged from $18,000 for agreeing to two
more years of service to $150,000 for six years. This plan hoped to build on the
initial investment of between $350,000 and $500,000 to train a SOF operator, an
investment magnified through extensive operational experience.
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While perhaps a helpful incentive for many SOF operators, the particular emphasis on increased remuneration for continued service cannot
halt the transition of SOF personnel to PSCs and may even lead to difficulties within the US military. By way of explanation, assessments have found
the incentive program’s results to be “modest.”17 As outlined earlier, military pay and allowances will not match those in the private sector where
annual salaries for experienced SOF operators may be in the six-figure
range. As one former SOF operator explained, “[Y]ou can stay in the military if you are patriotic, but then your ideals are outweighing your pocketbook.”18 What is more, the intangibles of military service—patriotism and
recognition by the state—may also now imbue private employment. Consider the words of US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher in
response to the deaths of four Blackwater USA employees in Iraq in March
2005: “They played a vital role in our mission to bring democracy, and opportunity to the people of Iraq. We will always remember their courage, dedication, and ultimate sacrifice for their country in the name of freedom. We
mourn the loss of these brave men and extend our deepest sympathies to
their families.”19 In light of this praise, the line between sacrifice and service
to country versus occupationalism, personal gain, and the sufficing of need
becomes increasingly indistinct.20
Additionally, pressures emanating from the conventional elements of
the US military make it difficult for SOF to receive further beneficial treatment. The December 2004 plan was, in fact, a scaled down version of a much
more generous SOF package. This reduction was due mainly to charges of favoritism and concerns that conventional forces would want similar treatment.21
In this regard, Representative Jim Saxton, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Unconventional Threats Panel, asserts that this was the
most contentious issue in the debate regarding retention and bonuses: “The
fear was we would cause a lot of angst with other enlisted personnel. . . . We
were afraid they may have felt pushed aside because special forces were being
treated differently. That was the biggest question in the entire process.”22
These responses are in line with the resistance to institutional change
that has long been a feature of SOF’s development (in the United States and
elsewhere): “Animosity towards special operations forces is engendered as
much by the competition for scarce resources as it is by philosophical differences in what constitutes an acceptable approach to military operations.”23
Whereas the money is still not sufficient for the military to compete successfully for the retention of SOF expertise, it already appears to be too much in the
eyes of the conventional forces. The thought being that it makes SOF even
more “special,” it overemphasizes SOF’s contribution, and it implies that other
military contributions are somehow less remarkable.
Winter 2006-07
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“Policymakers should assess the advantages
and disadvantages of the public and private
sectors in order to measure the degree
to which US policy might best benefit
from SOF’s strategic utility.”

SOF Expertise—A Strategic Resource
In circumstances in which conventional expertise is not appropriate because of inadequate skillsets, political restrictions, and financial limitations,
there are several functions that directly contribute to SOF’s strategic utility: the
raising of public morale, the showcasing of military prowess in an effort to deter,
the humiliation of the enemy, the reassuring of domestic and international audiences, the prevention of conflict escalation, and the maintenance of stability in
strategically important areas.24 With respect to PSCs, an alternative approach to
the above would be to treat SOF not as individuals requiring incentives, but
rather as a strategic resource. US policymakers must consider how this resource
is best utilized and whether such a resource should be under government or private management. Put differently, policymakers should assess the advantages
and disadvantages of the public and private sectors in order to measure the degree to which US policy might best benefit from SOF’s strategic utility.
At present, the PSC presence provides flexibility to US policymakers
along several lines. In the realm of global strategy, the effective implementation
of a preventative war strategy, as detailed in the White House’s 2002 National
Security Strategy, requires that the US leadership be able to rely on a pool of sufficient military manpower. This pool conducts both military operations and
serves as a deterrent to rogue states and terrorist organizations. Should the US
become engaged in an operation where its military manpower is overly committed, US credibility will suffer. PSCs, therefore, serve as an adjunct to US military
presence by performing tasks that were once conducted by military members.
Regarding financial and political imperatives, substantially increasing the overall number of Americans in uniform is not currently a policy objective of the US government, and it is not just an attempt to avoid debates related
to the reinstitution of the draft or some other form of national service. To quote
former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: “I am very reluctant to increase
end strength. . . . Resources are always finite, and the question is, would we be
better off increasing manpower or increasing capability and lethality?”25 Sec66
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retary Rumsfeld’s concerns are borne out by Congressional Budget Office statistics that determine the annual price tag of a 100,000-member increase to cost
approximately $10 billion. What is more, this amount covers only personnel
costs such as housing, medical care, and family benefits—additional training
and equipment are not included. These costs are considerable and reflect the
longstanding military mantra that with a professional force, “you recruit a soldier, but you retain their families.”26 With the PSC option, though initial costs
of employment might be more substantial than the public sector alternative, the
long-term costs of a larger force structure do not have to be considered.
Yet, does fulfillment of these various priorities necessitate reliance
upon the SOF resource specifically? At present, PSCs conduct a range of contracted tasks including security advising, security sector training, static security, convoy security, and close protection for a variety of clients—states,
corporations, international organizations, and humanitarian nongovernmental
organizations. However, not all SOF skill sets are applicable for these tasks.
One might argue that firms with experienced personnel garnered from different
segments of the government security sector would more than meet the demand
of many of these clients. In other words, given a particular criterion, conventional, rather than SOF, expertise may be more appropriate. What is more, it is
important to recognize that while SOF expertise is sometimes interpreted as
“generalist” because of its adaptable nature, within SOF community there are
specific core missions and operators are trained to task: “The reality is that SOF
units are organized, trained, and equipped to carry out one of the core missions,
and although they have an ability to move away from their field of specialist capability, that ability is, in reality, limited.”27 In this light, some PSC tasks such
as close protection, former SOF personnel may not have received the specific
training to carrying out such missions. In other cases, a certain SOF capability
may not be relevant. For instance, US Air Force combat controllers are being
lured away from the US military by PSCs and were targeted in the aforementioned retention drive. This is despite the fact that their unique speciality of
vectoring warplanes onto targets under hostile conditions is not one currently
in demand by PSC clients.28
US policymakers need to overcome two barriers in order to treat SOF
as a strategic resource. First, independent of the PSC challenge, is the fact that
SOF have not been used to their full strategic potential. Analysis of recent operations has found a significant emphasis on SOF’s more direct combat role.29 This
approach sees the application of highly trained operators in combat roles that
might be of great use for propaganda purposes as previously indicated. This is in
keeping with earlier studies that suggests the “American Way of War,” as coined
by Russell Weigley, has difficulty incorporating SOF forces because of the longstanding preference for decisive engagement and the overwhelming application
Winter 2006-07
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of force.30 Not only does this approach neglect other indirect, advisory, and covert capabilities of SOF, it does not take advantage of SOF’s strength vis-à-vis
conventional forces. There is a need for US policymakers to be educated consumers of SOF—allowing them to appreciate the certain finesse of SOF, rather
than solely their mystique—so that their strategic utility is maximized in applicable operations: “[T]hose missions where the penalty for failure is high and
only specially selected, trained, and equipped men can succeed—where the national policy demands a tailored response rather than brute force.”31 In short,
there is the need for policymakers to understand the complete spectrum of SOF
capabilities so they can determine why and what resources should remain under
government control.
Second, the savvy of policymakers as educated consumers of the SOF
resource has direct implications for PSC contracting. Despite studies suggesting
that power and authority are moving away from the state in an era of globalization, characterized by the growth of non-state actors and transnational
markets, the particular role of the state in shaping and managing the PSC industry is still important.32 Authors Norrin Ripsman and T. V. Paul contend, the
powerful—states with ample resources and influence—are more likely to be impacted by, and have a greater ability to respond to, international shifts and developments differently: “It makes no sense to assume that transnational phenomena
will affect the weak and the small, the strong and secure equally.”33
Because the United States is such a large player in the PSC marketplace, in terms of being where most PSCs reside and for generating the greatest
demand for their services, it is crucial in determining “the market’s ecology”
related to PSCs.34 However, to date, the United States has not exercised its market power. It has largely accepted what the PSCs have had to offer—in particular the services provided by former SOF personnel—rather than taking an
active role in questioning whether this is the best use of the SOF resources. It
has not closely assessed, on a contract-per-contract basis, whether the SOF resource even need be employed to support various contingencies. Of much
greater impact is the fact that the United States has not introduced consistent
qualitative regulation for US-based PSC personnel or companies that would,
appropriately, set the official parameters for professionalism, capability, and
human rights observance. Consciously undertaking these steps, rather than allowing the PSC industry to determine what is offered, would permit US
policymakers to exercise “the mechanism through which the preferred model
of [PSC] professionalism is communicated.”35

Conclusion
General Schoomaker, the US Army Chief of Staff, warns that while
SOF may be the ideal strategic resource for contemporary challenges, SOF
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must nevertheless identify the constantly changing nature of said challenges:
“USSOCOM faces an operational environment characterized by accelerating
geopolitical change, rapid technological advancement, evolving threats, constrained resources, and potential new roles. These factors necessitate innovative thinking and new ways to shape change if we are to maintain the widest
array of options for protecting America’s interests.”36 PSCs should be added
to this list of factors for US officials, military and civilian alike, to consider
and manage. This is not to say that the PSC industry should not exist. It will be
difficult for the “genie” to be shoved back into the bottle to a point that the
state monopoly on violence is again predominant. Moreover, attempting to
do so would deny access to the private sector’s options on versatility and innovation that is critical to the ongoing Global War on Terrorism.37 Nevertheless, steps should be taken to assess how the PSC industry functions and
sustains itself. Otherwise, other methods implemented by the United States to
keep the SOF resource from slipping into private sector hands may not suffice, while adding to the ire of conventional forces. While the United States is
experiencing greater reliance on SOF, and as such, is encountering the dilemmas posed by growth of private security companies, it is also in the unique position to act in such a manner as to establish the appropriate balance between
the public and private sectors with regard to the future of these organizations.
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